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LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF 
ENTERTAINMENT? 
 
This comment focuses on the case Arizona ex rel Goddard v. Harkins 
Amusement Enterprises and uses it to explore whether the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) is being distorted and misused if theater owners 
are required to install and provide equipment so as to fully accommodate 
hearing- and vision impaired customers.  The comment begins by outlining 
the ADA using case examples and detailing the analytical framework 
courts use to evaluate claims asserted under the Act.  It then discusses the 
accommodations the motion picture industry currently provides disabled 
patrons, and, after evaluating these existing accommodations, outlines the 
financial and technical effect full compliance under the ADA would have 
on the motion picture industry.  Lastly, the article suggests possible action 
for courts and the public to take in order to balance the interests of disabled 
Americans and the motion picture industry, ultimately concluding that full 
compliance under the ADA would place an undue burden on the motion 
picture industry.  
	  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2000, famed actor and director Clint Eastwood made headlines 
when he took a politically incorrect stance:  he litigated a case against a 
disabled woman who claimed that under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”) his Mission Ranch resort was not wheelchair-accessible.1  
“‘If you’re right, you’ve got to hold your ground,’ Eastwood said.  ‘I also 
fought for the businessmen and businesswomen who own small businesses 
who are trying to get by and they get worked over by those people.’”2 
The plaintiffs in the case were Diane and Michael zum Brunnen, visi-
tors of Mr. Eastwood’s resort in Carmel, California.3  At that time, the re-
sort had two wheelchair-accessible bathrooms, a wheelchair-accessible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1.  Alan Gathright & Maria Alicia Gaura, Eastwood Wins Suit Over ADA, S.F. CHRON., 
Sept. 30, 2000, at A15 [hereinafter Gathright & Gaura]. 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. 
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suite, and a handicap-accessible parking space.4  The plaintiffs claimed that 
the bathrooms were 240 feet from the Mission Ranch Restaurant without 
signs directing the way, the suite was too expensive, the hotel office was 
not wheelchair accessible, and the parking space was not properly marked.5  
To make up for these inadequacies, the zum Brunnens’ attorneys demanded 
a $577,000 settlement from Eastwood.6  Rather than pay up, though, East-
wood fought the claim.7  Besides showing up daily in federal court, he tes-
tified before a Congressional committee in May 2000, urging lawmakers to 
stop frivolous lawsuits by amending the ADA to require that plaintiffs no-
tify business owners of access problems and give them ninety days to make 
improvements before filing suit.8 
Criticism against Eastwood was scathing.9  The vast majority of ADA 
cases are settled out of court where business owners often pay cash to 
plaintiffs while quietly making the disabled access improvements to their 
businesses.10  Sid Wolinsky, the director of litigation services for Disability 
Rights Advocates in Oakland, scoffed, “‘[H]e’s being Mr. Clint Eastwood 
“make my day” Mr. Tough Guy . . . . It’s ridiculous for him to say he didn’t 
know what needed to be done’ to eliminate physical barriers for the dis-
abled . . . . ‘I can’t think of an area that is more clear-cut.’”11  Unintention-
ally, however, Mr. Wolinsky hit upon the crux of the problem with the 
ADA.  There is nothing clear-cut about ADA requirements, as evidenced 
by the current debate rocking the motion picture industry:  movie theater 
access for vision- and hearing-impaired patrons.12 
In 2005, two disabled Arizonans filed complaints that would dramati-
cally change the movie theater industry.13  Frederick Lindstrom and Larry 
Wanger lodged their complaints against Harkins Amusement Enterprises 
(“Harkins”), a movie theater chain with over eighty percent of its theaters 
located in Arizona.14  Each plaintiff separately attempted to attend a movie 
at a Harkins movie theater location.15  However, Harkins was unable to ac-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Gathright & Gaura, supra note 1. 
8.  Id. 
9.  See id.  
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. 
12.  See infra Part II. 
13.  See infra Part II.C. 
14.  See HARKINS THEATERS, http://www.harkinstheatres.com/theatres.aspx (last visited 
Aug. 12, 2011). 
15.  Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., 603 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 
	   
2011] LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF ENTERTAINMENT 211 
commodate them because of their disabilities, leading each patron to file a 
complaint of public accommodation discrimination with Arizona’s Civil 
Rights Division.16 
The State of Arizona sued Harkins in 2008, and theater patrons Lind-
strom and Wanger intervened as plaintiffs.17  Harkins removed the case to 
federal court, which granted its motion to dismiss.18  The State and the two 
patrons then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.19  That court 
reversed the motion to dismiss, holding that as a matter of law, the suit fell 
under the purview of the ADA.20  In addressing the issue of what specific 
technology theaters might be required to have, the Ninth Circuit ruled 
“open captioning is not mandated by the ADA as a matter of law.”21  How-
ever, the Court left open whether theaters are required by law to provide 
closed captioning and descriptive narration.22 
In a press release posted to his website, Arizona Attorney General 
Terry Goddard announced the Ninth Circuit’s “[g]roundbreaking [r]eversal 
in [the] [m]ovie [t]heater [d]isability [c]ase.”23  In the release, he stated,  
“[t]his is a groundbreaking legal decision because it is the first time that a 
Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled on whether the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act requires captions or descriptions in movie theaters.”24  Goddard 
then expressed his appreciation, stating, 
We are gratified that the Ninth Circuit rejected Harkins’ argu-
ment that the ADA . . . require[s] only that individuals with dis-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2010) [hereinafter Goddard]. 
16.  Id. 
17.  Id.; see also Arizona v. Harkins Amusement Enters., 548 F. Supp. 2d 723 (D. Ariz. 
2008). 
18.  Goddard, 603 F.3d at 669. 
19.  Id.  
20.  Id. at 671, 675. 
21.  Id. at 673, 668 (defining open captioning as a system that displays every spoken word 
of a movie in text that appears at the bottom of a movie theater screen). 
22.  See id. at 675, 668 (explaining closed captioning displays that transmit captions to 
viewers through personal devices on an individual basis, so that the only patrons seeing the cap-
tions are those who request them); Frequently Asked Questions, MOPIX MOTION PICTURE 
ACCESS, http://ncam.wgbh.org/mopix/faq.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2011) (“Narrated descrip-
tions provide information about key visual elements . . . .  The descriptions are inserted into 
pauses in the soundtrack and do not interfere with the dialogue.”). 
23.  Press Release, Ariz. Att’y Gen. Terry Goddard, Terry Goddard Announces Ground-
breaking Reversal in Movie Theater Disability Case (Apr. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.azag.gov/press_releases/april/2010/Press%20Release%20-
%20Terry%20Goddard%20Announces%20Groundbreaking%20Reversal%20in%20Movie%20T
heater%20Disability%20Case.html.   
24.  Id. 
  
212 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:209 
abilities gain entrance to the theater, but not access to the sound-
track or key visual features of the films shown . . . . This deci-
sion makes it clear that the ADA is about more than physical ac-
cess to a public accommodation—it is also about ensuring 
access to the services that the public accommodation provides.25 
Due in large part to Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement 
Enterprises, movie theater access for the disabled is currently garnering a 
great deal of attention.  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) recently an-
nounced that it  
is considering revising its regulation implementing Title III of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act in order to establish re-
quirements for making the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
accommodations, or advantages offered by movie theater own-
ers or operators at movie theaters accessible to individuals who 
are deaf . . . or who are blind . . . by screening movies with 
closed captioning or video description.26 
In a notice handed down to the motion picture industry, the DOJ pro-
vided “advance notice” and sought comments on the issue.27  A variety of 
blogs discuss the need for closed captioning and descriptive narration.28  
Some even dispense tax advice, informing small businesses of tax cuts 
available to them should they decide to embrace closed captioning.29  In 
Alameda County, California, a class action lawsuit has been filed against 
movie theater giant Cinemark, alleging the theater chain discriminates 
against the deaf by not providing captioned movies.30  The issue is offi-
cially ripe, and the time has come to reach a consensus that takes into ac-
count the interest of the motion picture industry and its disabled patrons. 
American theaters are now facing a complicated issue:  should theater 
owners be required to install and provide equipment in order to fully ac-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25.  Id. 
26.  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Movie Captioning and Video Descrip-
tion, 75 Fed. Reg. 43467, 43467–43476 (July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36).  
27.  Fact Sheet:  Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Movie Captioning and Video 
Description, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 3, 2010), 
http://www.ada.gov/anprm2010/factshtcrt_movie_captions_anprm_2010.htm. 
28.  E.g., CLOSEDCAPTIONING.NET, http://www.closedcaptioning.net (last visited Aug. 14, 
2011); CLOSED CAPTIONING BLOG, http://abercap.com/blog/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2011).  
29.  E.g., Ask Your Tax Man, CLOSEDCAPTIONING.NET (Jan. 19, 2010), 
http://www.closedcaptioning.net/techtips/ask-your-tax-man.  
30.  Vic Lee, Hearing Impaired File Class Action Against Cinemark, KGO BAY AREA 
NEWS (Nov. 30, 2010), 
http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/east_bay&id=7817681. 
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commodate their hearing and visually impaired customers under the ADA?  
Regulations promulgated under the ADA are failing to balance the compet-
ing interests of disabled Americans with those who provide entertainment 
facilities to the public.  At some point a line must be drawn.  As the First 
Circuit pointed out in United States v. Hoyt Cinemas Corp., “[t]he ADA 
places substantial emphasis on equality of access.  As a matter of common 
sense, this cannot be absolute equality; a tilt-back chair for ordinary patrons 
does not therefore entail a tilt-back platform for a wheelchair.”31  Recent 
trends tilting the balance in favor of the disabled are imposing prohibitive 
burdens on private enterprise,32 and Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins 
Amusement Enterprises presents the Ninth Circuit with the perfect oppor-
tunity to bring equity back to regulations under the ADA.33 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether the ADA is being dis-
torted and misused.  Part II of this article outlines the ADA and, using case 
examples, discusses the analytical framework courts use to evaluate claims 
asserted under the Act.  The paper also provides specific examples of the 
ways in which the motion picture industry has made allowances for its dis-
abled patrons.  Part III of this article discusses the current implications of 
the ADA and its effect on the motion picture industry, specifically focusing 
on the financial impact ADA compliance would have on the industry.  
Lastly, Part IV suggests possible action for courts and the public to take in 
attempting to balance the interests of disabled Americans and the motion 
picture industry. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  The Americans with Disabilities Act 
In 1990 Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) based on congressional findings about the status of disabled 
Americans.34  Congress declared that, “physical or mental disabilities in 
no way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of soci-
ety, yet many people with physical or mental disabilities have been pre-
cluded from doing so because of discrimination.”35  Finding that dis-
crimination against disabled individuals exists in a wide variety of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31.  United States v. Hoyt Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 567 (1st Cir. 2004). 
32.  See infra Part III. 
33.  See generally Goddard, 603 F.3d 666.  
34.  See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2010). 
35.  Id. at § 12101(a)(1). 
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“critical areas,”36 Congress stated, “individuals with disabilities continu-
ally encounter various forms of discrimination, including . . . the dis-
criminatory effects of architectural . . . [and] communication barriers . . . 
[and] failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices.”37  
Thus, the Act placed the federal government in the role of enforcer by in-
voking the “sweep of congressional authority” in an effort “to provide a 
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities,” and sought “to provide 
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities.”38 
Title III of the ADA outlaws discrimination by public accommoda-
tions, stating that discrimination includes 
a failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no 
individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, segre-
gated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals be-
cause of the absence of auxiliary aids and services, unless the 
entity can demonstrate that taking such steps would fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the good, service, facility, privilege, ad-
vantage, or accommodation being offered or would result in an 
undue burden.39 
To prevail on a discrimination claim under Title III, the plaintiff 
must establish a prima facie case that: “(1) [the plaintiff is] disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that 
owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the 
plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of 
his [or her] disability.”40 
There is an analytical framework for any party making a claim of dis-
crimination under the ADA.  First, the plaintiff must prove that a modifica-
tion was requested, and that such modification is reasonable.41  To meet 
this burden, the plaintiff must introduce “evidence that the requested modi-
fication is reasonable in the general sense.”42  The burden then shifts to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36.  Id. at § 12101(a)(3). 
37.  Id. at § 12101(a)(5). 
38.  Id. at § 12101(b). 
39.  42 U.S.C § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2010) (emphasis added).  
40.  Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 
2010) [hereinafter Goddard]. 
41.  Access Now, Inc. v. S. Fla. Stadium Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 
2001). 
42.  Id. (quoting Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052 (5th Cir. 
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defendant who will be expected to produce evidence that the requested 
modification is unreasonable.43  If the court finds that the plaintiff has met 
his or her burden, the defendant must then make the requested modifica-
tion, unless the defendant can meet the additional burden of proving that 
the modification would either constitute an undue burden or that it would 
fundamentally alter the nature of the public accommodation.44  Although 
the term “undue burden” is not specifically defined in the statute, the De-
partment of Justice (“DOJ”) suggests that the term be interpreted in the 
same way as the “undue hardship” standard.45  Used in the employment 
provisions of the ADA, “undue hardship” is defined as a “significant diffi-
culty or expense.”46 
The case Coleman v. Zatechka illustrates the protections of the 
ADA.47  In Coleman, a handicapped student with cerebral palsy was admit-
ted to the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, in 1991.48  Due to the paresis in 
both her legs, she required the services of a personal attendant to assist her 
with such tasks as dressing, showering, and toileting.49  The summer before 
Coleman began her schooling, she submitted a housing contract application 
to secure dormitory housing.50  However, rather than submit her name to 
the general lottery to be randomly assigned a roommate, the University 
automatically assigned her to a room without a roommate.51  Coleman later 
learned that the University’s policy was not to assign roommates to stu-
dents who required a personal attendant.52  In the ensuing lawsuit, the Uni-
versity repeatedly stated that it would “not require another student to be 
[Coleman’s] roommate.”53 
First, Coleman successfully established a prima facie case:  1) she, the 
plaintiff, was disabled within the meaning of the ADA because cerebral 
palsy is recognized as a disability under the Act;54 2) the University of Ne-
braska, the defendant, is a private entity operating a place of public ac-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1997)). 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id.; see also Goddard, 603 F.3d at 675. 
45.  1–3 ADA:  PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS § 3.02 (Matthew Bender & Co., LEXIS 
2010).  
46.  Id.  
47.  Coleman v. Zatechka, 824 F. Supp. 1360 (D. Neb. 1993). 
48.  Id. at 1362. 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. at 1363. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Coleman, 824 F. Supp. at 1365.  
54.  Id. at 1367. 
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commodation, as the Nebraska Legislature established the school as a state 
institution;55 and 3) she was denied public accommodations when the 
school prevented her from living in a residence hall with a roommate be-
cause she had cerebral palsy.56 
The court ruled that the school’s conduct was unacceptable, stating 
that “[t]he ADA’s Findings and Purposes illustrate that Congress, in enact-
ing the statute, aimed to bring people with disabilities into society’s main-
stream, to cause the kinds of interaction which might facilitate recognition 
of the true equality of human worth as between individuals—regardless of 
disabilities.”57  As implemented, the University’s policy unnecessarily 
separated students with disabilities from those without disabilities, striking 
at the essence of the ADA by specifically violating the statute’s stated pur-
pose: “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”58  In es-
sence, the court used the Act to ensure that Coleman had the same opportu-
nity as her peers—that is, to live in her university’s dormitory housing with 
a roommate.59  This case perfectly illustrates how the findings and purposes 
of the ADA are applied. 
In Tennessee v. Lane, the Supreme Court upheld a more controversial 
application of the ADA.60  In an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the 
Court staunchly supported the goals of the ADA by upholding it in the face 
of an Eleventh Amendment challenge.61  George Lane and Beverly Jones, 
two paraplegics, filed suit in 1998 against the state of Tennessee, alleging 
that they were denied access to the state court system by reason of their 
disabilities.62  Lane alleged that he was compelled to appear in court to an-
swer to criminal charges, but upon attempting to access the second floor of 
the courthouse, he found that there was no elevator and was forced to crawl 
up two flights of stairs to enter the courtroom.63  On a second visit to the 
courthouse, he refused to crawl or be carried and was consequently arrested 
and jailed for failure to appear.64  Jones, a certified court reporter, alleged 
that she had been unable to gain access to a number of Tennessee state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55.  Id. at 1367–68. 
56.  Id. at 1362–63. 
57.  Id. at 1373. 
58.  Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)). 
59.  Coleman, 824 F. Supp. at 1372–73. 
60.  Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). 
61.  See id. at 533–34. 
62.  Id. at 513. 
63.  Id. at 513–14. 
64.  Id. at 514. 
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courthouses, and had therefore lost work and the opportunity to participate 
in the judicial process.65  Tennessee moved to dismiss the suit on the 
ground that the Eleventh Amendment barred the claims.66 
The Court began by stating, 
Congress may abrogate the State’s Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity.  To determine whether it has done so in any given case, we 
“must resolve two predicate questions:  first, whether Congress 
unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity; 
and second, if it did, whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid 
grant of constitutional authority.”67 
According to the Court, the first question was “easily answered” be-
cause the ADA specifically states that no state shall be immune under the 
Eleventh Amendment.68 
The Court continued, “Congress can abrogate a State’s sovereign 
immunity when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”69  This, as “[it] ha[s] often 
[been] acknowledged, is a broad power indeed.”70  The Court then com-
mented on the nature of Title II, saying it “seeks to enforce . . . [a] prohi-
bition on irrational disability discrimination . . . [and] a variety of other 
basic constitutional guarantees . . . like the right of access to the courts at 
issue in this case, that are protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”71 
In evaluating the constitutionality of Title II, the Court stated that Ti-
tle II’s validity must be judged against the backdrop of the historical expe-
rience it reflects.72  One of the numerous examples the Court provided ad-
dressed voting:  “Congress enacted Title II against a backdrop of pervasive 
unequal treatment in the administration of state services and programs, in-
cluding systematic deprivations of fundamental rights.  For example, ‘[a]s 
of 1979, most States . . . categorically disqualified “idiots” from voting, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65.  Id. 
66.  Lane, 541 U.S. at 514; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State.”). 
67.  Lane, 541 U.S. at 517 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)). 
68.  Id. at 518. 
69.  Id.  
70.  Id. (citation omitted). 
71.  Id. at 522–23.  
72.  Id. at 523.   
  
218 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:209 
without regard to individual capacity.’”73 
The Court ultimately held that Title II of the ADA constitutes a valid 
exercise of Congressional authority.74 
Tennessee v. Lane continues to be a powerful opinion, not only for the 
majority’s endorsement of the ADA in the face of an Eleventh Amendment 
challenge, but also for the dissent’s powerful denunciation of the major-
ity.75  In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the dissent at-
tacked Congress’ ADA findings.76  Calling the majority’s examples of 
wrongs dealt to the disabled a “digression,” Rehnquist critically states that 
the majority’s recounting of “historical discrimination against the disabled 
through institutionalization laws, restrictions on marriage, voting, and pub-
lic education, conditions in mental hospitals, and various other forms of 
unequal treatment in the administration of public programs and services” is 
“outdated” and “generalized.”77  The dissent then goes on to state that this 
“unexamined, anecdotal evidence does not suffice,”78 and that “[t]he 
Court’s attempt to disguise the lack of congressional documentation with a 
few citations to judicial decisions cannot retroactively provide support for 
Title II.”79 
In conclusion, the dissent explicates that Title II of the ADA suffers 
from “massive overbreadth,”80 and that 
[e]ven if the anecdotal evidence and conclusory statements re-
lied on by the majority could be properly considered, the mere 
existence of an architecturally “inaccessible” courthouse . . . 
does not state a constitutional violation. . . . We have never held 
that a person has a constitutional right to makes his way into a 
courtroom without any external assistance.81 
B.  Motion Picture Industry Allowances 
Nationwide, theaters have already made allowances for disabled pa-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73.  Lane, 541 U.S. at 524 (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 
432, 464 (1985)). 
74.  Id. at 533–34. 
75.  See id. at 538–54. 
76.  See id. at 541, 545–46. 
77.  Id. at 541. 
78.  Id. at 542 (citation omitted); see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 
U.S. 356, 370 (2001). 
79.  Lane, 541 U.S. at 543. 
80.  Id. at 551. 
81.  Id. at 546–47. 
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trons under the ADA.82  The alteration of theater architecture is especially 
demonstrative of this.83  The Architectural and Transportation Barriers 
Compliance Board (the “Access Board”) is a congressionally appointed 
board under the ADA tasked with drafting regulations relating to architec-
tural and transportation barriers for the disabled for the DOJ.84  The regula-
tions are then either adopted or modified by the DOJ, and must at least be 
“consistent with the minimum guidelines and requirements” that have been 
drafted by the Access Board.85  In 1991, the Access Board provided the 
DOJ with accessibility guidelines “that required wheelchair seating to be 
located to provide lines of sight comparable to those for all viewing ar-
eas.”86  The Access Board solicited comments on sightlines at entertain-
ment venues where patrons might frequently stand, such as at sporting 
events, but did not propose any regulations.87  Ultimately, however, when 
the DOJ thereafter promulgated Standard 4.33.3, it omitted any reference to 
the issue of standing spectators.88 
The issue of standing spectators did not arise again until 1993 during 
the DOJ’s investigations into the facilities for the 1996 Olympic Games, to 
be held in Atlanta, Georgia.89  At that time, the DOJ made the concrete 
statement that “‘lines of sight comparable to those for members of the gen-
eral public’ meant ‘line[s] of sight over standing spectators.’”90 
As a result of this statement, the Paralyzed Veterans of America filed 
suit in 1996 against the owners of the MCI Center,91 a venue being con-
structed in downtown Washington D.C. designed to host football games, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82.  See, e.g., Accessibility, AMC THEATRES, 
http://www.amctheatres.com/AMCInfo/Accessibility/?WT.mc_id=nh_about (last visited Aug. 14, 
2011).  
83.  See United States v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 763 (9th Cir. 2008).  
84.  David McArdle, Using the Americans with Disabilities Act to Inform “Access to 
Sporting Venues” Under the Disabilities Convention, 27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 317, 320 (2009); see 
also Adam A. Milani, “Oh, Say, Can I See—and Who Do I Sue if I Can’t?”:  Wheelchair Users, 
Sightlines over Standing Spectators, and Architect Liability Under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act, 52 FLA. L. REV. 523, 529 (2000). 
85.  McArdle, supra note 84; see also Milani, supra note 84 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c)). 
86.  McArdle, supra note 84, at 321 (citation omitted); see also Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 2296, 2314 
(proposed Jan. 22, 1991) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191). 
87.  McArdle, supra note 84, at 321–22; see also Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 2296, 2314 (proposed Jan. 22, 
1991) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191). 
88.  Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. at 582. 
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basketball games, concerts, and other special events.92  As the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia stated, 
Because the games and events will be exciting affairs and the 
patrons are expected, even encouraged at times, to stand and 
cheer for the home teams, wheelchair users are understandably 
concerned about whether the seats available to them will allow 
them to see the action during the most dramatic moments.93 
Before suit was filed, D.C. Arena ensured, on their own initiative, 
that sixty percent of the wheelchair seating had sightlines over standing 
spectators.94  Despite these efforts, the District Court found the plan defi-
cient, stating that the owners needed to provide sightlines over standing 
areas in seventy-five to eighty-eight percent of the areas where there was 
disabled seating.95  These numbers, the court deemed, would qualify as 
“substantial compliance.”96 
Both parties appealed.  D.C. Arena argued that Standard 4.33.3 did 
not require any of the wheelchair areas to have such sightlines, and the 
Paralyzed Veterans of America took the stance that one hundred percent 
compliance was the only way the owners could avoid violating the 
ADA.97  The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling, reason-
ing that one hundred percent compliance could only be achieved by hav-
ing all wheelchair seating areas separate from the rest of the spectators.98  
This result would also violate the ADA, as the Act requires wheelchair 
seating to be integrated with the seating for the other spectators.99  There-
fore, separating disabled seating from the seats of non-disabled patrons 
“would merely exacerbate wheelchair users’ physical and social isolation 
from the rest of the audience.”100 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92.  Id. at 580. 
93.  Id. 
94.  McArdle, supra note 84, at 323.  
95.  Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 588. 
96.  Id. 
97.  McArdle, supra note 84, at 324; see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 582.  
98.  Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 588. 
99.  Id. at 589. 
100.  McArdle, supra note 84, at 325; see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 
582.  
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The issue of architecture and disabled seating eventually affected 
the motion picture industry.  In 1999, the government filed suit against 
AMC Entertainment, a nationwide theater chain,101 alleging that AMC 
violated the ADA by restricting handicapped seating to only the front sec-
tions of its stadium-style movie theaters.102  The court found that AMC 
discriminated against handicapped patrons by not placing accessible seat-
ing in areas where lines of sight were comparable to those for members of 
the general public.103  AMC Entertainment was given five years, begin-
ning January 10, 2006, to implement changes to all future and existing 
theaters.104  The opinion contained a lengthy list of retrofitting that AMC 
was required to undertake, listing specific changes for each and every 
auditorium.105  For example, the Order for Lakes Square 12 in Leesburg, 
Florida stated “Auditoriums 3, 4, 5, and 6:  AMC shall remove two 
Wheelchair Spaces from the front row of the Traditional Section and re-
locate them to the last row of this Section adjacent to the two existing 
Wheelchair and Companion Spaces.”106 
However, what the court only implicitly acknowledged was that AMC 
had already made allowances for the disabled.107  In the subsequent appeal, 
the court stated that “theaters built in 1995 require the most significant ret-
rofitting, including installing ramps, removing mini-risers and constructing 
new seats, whereas other newer theaters, having been altered to respond to 
customer complaints, require less retrofitting.”108  This statement indicates 
that AMC made efforts to accommodate its disabled patrons without the 
threat of legal action.  As a direct result of theaters making increasing al-
lowances throughout the years, less retrofitting was needed in newer than 
in older theaters. 
After the district court ordered AMC to retrofit all of its theaters, 
AMC appealed on the ground that it was “not told the rules of building sta-
dium-seating theaters until, at the earliest, the government published its 
view of Section 4.33.3.”109  Section 4.33.3 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions states, “[w]heelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed seat-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101.  AMC THEATRES, http://www.amctheatres.com (last visited July 26, 2011). 
102.  United States v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., No. CV-99-01034-FMC(SHx), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6119, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2006).  
103.  Id. at *4, *13. 
104.  Id. at *6. 
105.  Id. at *15–60. 
106.  Id. at *26. 
107.  See id. 
108.  AMC Entm’t, Inc., 549 F.3d at 767–68. 
109.  Id. at 768. 
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ing plan and shall be provided so as to provide people with physical dis-
abilities a choice of admission prices and lines of sight comparable to those 
for members of the general public.”110  Because this regulation pre-dated 
the construction and subsequent popularity of stadium-style movie theaters 
by several years, it was unclear whether stadium-style theaters were re-
quired to comport to the same regulation.111  What resulted was inaction by 
the DOJ, with the Ninth Circuit stating, “the Access Board and the DOJ 
failed to provide clear direction as to the precise meaning of Section 
4.33.3.”112  The Ninth Circuit held that the lower court had abused its dis-
cretion and, in doing so, violated AMC’s due process rights by requiring 
the retrofitting of theaters regardless of their date of construction.113  
  What is evident from both Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. 
Arena and United States v. AMC Entertainment, Inc. is that the owners of 
the entertainment venues did take their disabled patrons into account prior 
to being subjected to legal action.114  What the patrons found unsatisfactory 
was that the owners refused to fully comply with their wishes.  Accord-
ingly, the patrons proceeded to file suit to force the companies to make 
greater accommodations than they had originally proposed.115 
Theater owners now face the next frontier of disabled accommoda-
tions in closed captioning and descriptive narration.  In the past several 
years, courts have handed down conflicting rulings.116  For example, in Ball 
v. AMC Entertainment, Inc., a Washington, D.C. District Court held that, 
although the ADA did not explicitly require movie theaters to provide its 
patrons with closed captioning,117 congressional intent clearly indicated 
that “the ADA might require new technology be used, as it is developed, to 
further accommodate disabled individuals.”118  In stark contrast, the court 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110.  28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2010). 
111.  AMC Entm’t, Inc., 549 F.3d at 764. 
112.  Id. 
113.  Id. at 768. 
114.  See id. at 763 (modifying designs for future theaters to accommodate the disabled); 
see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 582 (“[S]ome, but not all, of the wheelchair seat-
ing in the chosen designs would have lines of sight over standing spectators.”). 
115.  See AMC Entm’t, Inc., 549 F.3d at 763 (modifying designs for future theaters to ac-
commodate the disabled); see also Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 582 (“[S]ome, but not 
all, of the wheelchair seating in the chosen designs would have lines of sight over standing spec-
tators.”). 
116.  See Ball v. AMC Entm’t, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 17, 22 (2003).  But see Cornilles v. 
Regal Cinemas, Inc., 14 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 563, 563 No. 00-173-AS, (D. Or. Mar. 12, 
2002). 
117.  Ball, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 22; see also 1–3 ADA:  PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS § 3.02, 
supra note 45. 
118.  Ball, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 23; see also 1–3 ADA:  PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS § 3.02, 
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in Cornilles v. Regal Cinemas, Inc. held that Regal Cinemas was not re-
quired to accommodate its disabled patrons with closed captioning because 
“requiring Defendants to expend thousands of dollars per auditorium to in-
stall new technology [would be] unduly burdensome.”119  To prevent costly 
future battles faced by both sides in reaching a consensus about the allow-
ances the motion picture industry must make for its disabled patrons, it is 
important for the DOJ to act now and make an educated and realistic choice 
about what its stance on the issue will be. 
C.  Current Application 
After the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Hark-
ins Amusement Enterprises, the Law Office of Lainey Feingold announced 
that its clients, Fredrick Lindstrom and Larry Wanger, would soon be re-
filing their case.120  Lindstrom is a nearly deaf patron who alleges that three 
specific technologies would aid him in his movie-going experience.121  The 
first option is open captioning, a system that displays every spoken word of 
a movie in text that appears at the bottom of the screen.122  This occurs ei-
ther by engraving text onto each individual frame of a film123 or by using a 
separate projection system to project captions onto the movie screen.124  
Secondly, Lindstrom added that closed captioning, a relatively new tech-
nology, would also aid him in his movie-going experience.125  Closed cap-
tioning displays captions to viewers through personal devices on an indi-
vidual basis, so that the only patrons seeing the captions are those who 
request them.126 
Wanger is a nearly blind patron and alleges that only one type of 
technology, descriptive narration combined with headphones, would allow 
him to enjoy movies: 
Descriptive narration is a way of making visual media more 
meaningful to people with vision loss.  Narrated descriptions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
supra note 45. 
119.  Cornilles, 14 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 569; see also 1–3 ADA:  PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS § 3.02, supra note 45.  
120.  Federal Appeals Victory for Blind Movie Goers, LAW OFFICE OF LAINEY FEINGOLD:  
DISABILITY RIGHTS LEGAL ADVOCACY (May 9, 2010), http://lflegal.com/2010/05/harkins-
opinion#excerpt.  
121.  Goddard, 603 F.3d at 668. 
122.  Id. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. at 669. 
126.  Id. at 668. 
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provide information about key visual elements such as actions, 
settings, facial expressions, costumes, on-screen text and scene 
changes.  The descriptions are inserted into pauses in the sound-
track and do not interfere with the dialogue.127 
The Harkins court held that movie captioning and audio descriptions 
are “clearly” auxiliary aides and services that therefore fall under the pur-
view of the ADA.128  However, the DOJ’s Code of Regulations specifi-
cally states that theaters are not required to provide open captioning as a 
matter of law.129  The court, however, left the issue of closed captioning 
requirements open.130  In arguing against having to provide closed cap-
tioning, Harkins relied on interpretations of the ADA contained in the 
Federal Register, in which the DOJ only showed that the matter was still 
being debated.131  The court did not find this argument dispositive, declin-
ing “to give deference to Access Board guidelines that have not yet been 
adopted by the DOJ.”132 
In holding that the plaintiffs’ claim fell under the purview of the 
ADA, the Ninth Circuit enabled the plaintiffs to re-file their suit, alleging 
discrimination under the ADA for Harkins’ failure to provide closed cap-
tioning and descriptive narration.133  However, the court did make one very 
important statement for the defense: 
Our holding does not necessarily mean that Plaintiffs will be 
entitled to closed captioning and descriptive narration in Hark-
ins’s theaters.  Harkins may still be able to avail itself of sev-
eral defenses, such as the contention that the devices would 
fundamentally alter the nature of its services or constitute an 
undue burden.134 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) recently issued a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking in which it seeks to institute regulations that would re-
quire all theaters in the United States to accommodate disabled movie thea-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127.  MOPIX MOTION PICTURE ACCESS, supra note 22 (describing descriptive narration).   
128.  Goddard, 603 F.3d at 670. 
129.  Id. at 673; see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 (2010).  
130.  See Goddard, 603 F.3d at 675. 
131.  Id. at 674. 
132.  Id.; see also Miller v. Cal. Speedway Corp., 536 F.3d 1020, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008).  
133.  See Federal Appeals Victory for Blind Movie Goers, supra note 120. 
134.  Goddard, 603 F.3d at 675 (citations omitted). 
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ter patrons by providing both closed captioning and descriptive narration.135  
As a follow up, the DOJ recently included the topic in the appendix of the 
proposed rulemaking, stating that the Department “was considering the 
possibility of requiring public accommodations to exhibit all new movies in 
captioned format and with video description at every showing.”136  It then 
asked for public comment, concluding that  
rather than issue specific regulatory text at this time, the De-
partment has determined that it should obtain additional infor-
mation regarding issues raised by commenters . . . supplemental 
technical information, and updated information regarding the 
current and future status of the conversion to digital cinema by 
movie theater owners and operators.137 
To this end, the DOJ is planning to engage in rulemaking relating 
specifically to movie captioning under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”).138 
In analyzing the prima facie case for a discrimination claim under Ti-
tle III of the ADA, it is clear that the third requirement, in which the defen-
dant denies the plaintiff public accommodations because of his or her dis-
ability, is at issue in Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement 
Enterprises.139  Harkins’ best defense would be that the devices would con-
stitute an undue burden.140  Harkins, as well as any theater confronted with 
such a lawsuit, will be able to show undue burden by demonstrating to the 
court the exact costs incurred in making their screens compliant.141  Arts 
Access, an organization whose fundamental goal is to “encourage [indi-
viduals with disabilities] to participate fully in the rich cultural and artistic 
life throughout the state,”142 offers training services to theaters on ADA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135.  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Movie Captioning and Video Descrip-
tion, 75 Fed. Reg. 43467, 43467 (July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36).  
136.  Id. at 43469. 
137.  28 C.F.R. pt. 36 app. A (2010). 
138.  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Movie Captioning and Video Descrip-
tion, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43467.    
139.  Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. Harkins Amusement Enters., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
140.  See id. at 675. 
141.  See generally id. (stating that Harkins may still be able to avail itself of several de-
fenses, such as the contention that the devices would fundamentally alter the nature of the serv-
ices or constitute an undue burden). 
142.  About Arts Access, ARTS ACCESS, INC., http://www.artsaccessinc.org/about.html 
(last visited Aug. 12, 2011). 
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compliance.143  However, what the website fails to acknowledge is that the 
costs would be prohibitive.144 
A.  Digital v. Film Screens 
Standardized technology that operates closed captioning and descrip-
tive narration in conjunction with film screens does not exist.145  Therefore, 
before a theater can accommodate the disabled, it must make the initial step 
of converting its film screens to digital screens.146  Currently, estimates of 
the number of cinema screens in the United States that are equipped with 
digital projectors vary.147  Industry experts state that the number of digital 
screens is approaching approximately one third of all screens in the U.S.,148 
whereas the DOJ claims that approximately 5,000 of 38,794 screens have 
been converted.149  Regardless of the source of statistics, digital screens are 
the minority, meaning that most cinema screens in the United States are 
still equipped with film projectors.150  Further, estimates vary as to how 
long it will take most theaters, excluding specialty theaters, to be equipped 
with digital screens.151  For example, according to one commenter who pre-
sented findings to the DOJ, it will be approximately ten or more years be-
fore all of the screens in the United States are digital.152  On the other hand, 
industry experts predict that in three to five years, over ninety percent of 
screens will have converted to digital.153  However, this conversion de-
pends on a variety of factors, including the financial situation of movie 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143.  ADA Compliance Training, ARTS ACCESS, 
http://www.artsaccessinc.org/training.shtml (last visited Aug. 12, 2011). 
144.  See infra Part III.A–C. 
145.  Interview with Bryce Alden, Eng’r, Jim Whittlesey, Senior Vice President of Tech. 
& Operations, & John Wolski, Vice President of Exhibitor Servs., Deluxe Digital Cinema, in 
Burbank, Cal. (Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Interview with Alden]. 
146.  Id. 
147.  Compare id. with Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Movie Captioning 
and Video Description, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43473. 
148.  Interview with Alden, supra note 145. 
149.  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Movie Captioning and Video Descrip-
tion, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43473. 
150.  See also id. (stating the DOJ’s understanding that the vast majority of U.S. movie 
theaters currently exhibit film-based movies).  See generally Interview with Alden, supra note 
145 (stating digital screens are only one third of all screens in the U.S. and growing). 
151.  See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Movie Captioning and Video De-
scription, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43473.  
152.  Id. 
153.  Interview with Alden, supra note 145. 
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theater owners and operators, the state of the economy, and incentives be-
ing offered to promote the digital change.154 
What is not disputed is the high cost to convert a film screen to a digi-
tal screen.155  Conversion estimates, provided by commenters to the DOJ, 
range from $70,000 to $100,000, which is the cost per screen, not per cin-
ema complex.156  Therefore, a theater complex owner looking to convert 
his entire complex into one with digital screens would only be able to do so 
at great expense.  The additional costs do not end there; maintenance costs 
for digital projectors are much higher than those of film projectors, costing 
$5,000 to $10,000 more per year to maintain, which is approximately five 
times more than the annual maintenance cost for film projectors.157  There-
fore, theaters are not only looking at higher short term costs, they are also 
looking at permanently higher operating costs. 
B.  Closed Captioning 
Unlike open captioning, which is visible to the entire audience,158 
closed captioning makes it possible for exhibitors to provide captions to its 
patrons on an individual basis.159  There are three main types of closed cap-
tioning systems currently being produced.160  The first is called rear win-
dow display.161  The rear window captioning system produces a digital, 
lighted display that is mounted on the back wall of a movie theater.162  Pa-
trons are then given a transparent acrylic panel that can be mounted in the 
cup holder of a theater seat.163  The panel reflects the captions from the rear 
window display on the back wall of the theater so that the captions are su-
perimposed either below or on the movie screen, in the typical place one 
might see subtitles.164  There is no need for special prints or special screen-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154.  See generally Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Movie Captioning and 
Video Description, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43467–43476. 
155.  See id. at 43473.  
156.  Id. 
157.  Id. 
158.  MOPIX MOTION PICTURE ACCESS, supra note 22 (discussing how rear window cap-
tions differ from open captions). 
159.  Id. 
160.  See infra Part III.B.  
161.  See MOPIX MOTION PICTURE ACCESS, supra note 22 (describing how rear window 
captioning systems work). 
162.  Id. 
163.  Id. 
164.  Id. 
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ings, as the rear window display is its own functioning machine that works 
in tandem with a digital projector.165 
Ultra Stereo Labs is a manufacturer of the second type of closed 
captioning system, the Infrared Emitter System (“IR Emitter System”).166  
The IR Emitter System is composed of two pieces.167  The first piece is an 
infrared emitter device, which transmits closed caption text over infrared 
wavelengths.168  The list price is $1,450 per device.169  The second piece 
of the system is the infrared receiver, which can come in several forms.170  
Two of the most popular forms are a personal infrared receiver display 
and infrared receiving glasses.171  The personal display is a small box 
with a light-emitting diode (“LED”) light text display that clips to the 
armrest of a patron’s seat.172  The cost is $430 per personal display.173  
The infrared receiving glasses, which are worn by the patron, also use an 
LED light display and angled glass to overlay closed caption text on top 
of the movie image.174 
A third type of closed captioning system is produced by Doremi Cin-
ema and is called the CaptiView Closed Captioning System.175  As a pre-
liminary requirement for the system, a theater must employ the Doremi 
Digital Cinema Server, which has a list price of $18,400.176  Once this pre-
liminary hurdle has been passed, the system has two separate compo-
nents.177  The first component is a software application that is loaded onto 
the digital cinema server at a price of $950 per server.178  The software then 
enables the server to wirelessly transmit closed captions via a WiFi net-
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166.  See Infrared Closed Caption System, USL, INC., 
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(describing and displaying the features of the company’s closed captioning device). 
167.  See id. 
168.  Id. 
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22, 2010, 10:33 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Koch E-mail]. 
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172.  Id. 
173.  Koch E-mail, supra note 169. 
174.  Interview with Alden, supra note 145. 
175.  James Gardiner, Showest 2010 – 08 – Doremi CaptiView Closed Captioning System, 
CINE TECH GEEK (Apr. 22, 2010, 12:50AM), http://www.cinetechgeek.com/2010/04/22/showest-
2010-–-08-–-dorami-captiview-closed-caption-system/.  
176.  E-mail from Michael Archer, Vice President of Digital Cinema, Doremi Labs, Inc., 
to Erica N. Lucero (Oct. 27, 2010, 16:21 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Archer E-mail]. 
177.  Id. 
178.  Id. 
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work to individual CaptiView display devices which retail at $525 each.179  
The device “consists of a small, OLED display on a bendable support arm” 
that can be mounted into the cup holder of a theater seat.180  The display is 
equipped with a privacy visor so that it can be positioned in front of the pa-
tron and cause minimal distraction to those seated near that patron.181  A 
theater with ten screens would first need to purchase ten Doremi digital 
cinema servers, costing a total of $184,000.  Once these servers are pur-
chased, the theater would need to purchase a software package for each of 
the ten servers at a total cost of $9,500.  Lastly, the theater would need to 
buy enough personal display devices to meet demand at a cost of $525 
each.  Assuming each theater demands one such device, a single theater 
complex would be spending a total of $198,750 to outfit its complex with 
the CaptiView Closed Captioning System. 
Moreover, beyond the prohibitive cost, there are major logistical is-
sues that must be addressed before theaters should be required to provide 
disabled patrons with closed captioning.  Currently, there are no standards 
in place that regulate or make uniform the interaction of closed captioning 
equipment and digital theater equipment.182  When a digital movie is deliv-
ered to a theater, it is loaded onto a playback server.183  Because there are 
multiple manufacturers of both playback servers and closed captioning sys-
tems, standards are necessary to dictate how a playback server communi-
cates with a closed captioning device.184  Additionally, movie distributors 
have not been provided with delivery standards.185  On its website, Ultra 
Stereo Lab describes its IR Emitter System as a system that “complies with 
DCI and SMPTE draft standards.”186  As illuminated by the use of the word 
“draft,” there are currently no official standards, and as a result, distributors 
are currently limping along by using subtitling standards.187  Therefore, the 
multitude of logistical issues resulting from a lack of concrete standards 
makes it highly impractical for theaters to provide closed captioning. 
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C.  Descriptive Narration 
Disabled rights advocates claim that unlike closed captioning, de-
scriptive narration does not require a digital theater system.188  However, 
what these advocates fail to note is that there is currently no technology 
that could enable descriptive narration to run with a film projection sys-
tem.189  It is, therefore, more costly for a theater with a film projector to 
broadcast descriptive narration than it is for a digital theater.190  Like closed 
captioning systems, the cost of descriptive narration systems for digital 
theater owners is often high.  Descriptive narration can be achieved in one 
of two ways.191  The first way would be to install chairs equipped with 
audio jacks in theaters.192  This solution would enable a patron to plug a 
headset into the outlet and listen to the descriptive narration of the movie.  
However, this solution would likely be extremely costly.193  If disabled pa-
trons could sit anywhere in the theater, theater owners would be required to 
wire every single seat and purchase more expensive seats equipped with 
audio jacks for the entire theater.194 
The second alternative is much more cost-effective.  This method 
provides wireless headphones to each patron upon request and allows pa-
trons to tune into the descriptive narration using a variety of possible meth-
ods.195  One method would be for the patron to tune in to a specific FM 
channel through which the descriptive narration soundtrack is broadcast.196  
Another method could be utilized via a WiFi or Bluetooth network pro-
vided by the theater for the specific purpose of transmitting the narration.197  
Lastly, headphones are available through Ultra Stereo Systems for $80, 
which work with the same infrared emitter device that transmits closed cap-
tion text over infrared wavelengths (list price $1,450 per device).198  The 
cost to equip a one hundred-seat movie theater with the system made by 
Ultra Stereo Systems would be $9,450.  Equipping a ten-screen movie thea-
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ter complex with the system would therefore cost $94,500. 
Although descriptive narration is less costly than closed captioning, it 
is potentially fraught with regulatory problems, since wirelessly transmit-
ting descriptive narration will likely raise a variety of piracy issues.  For 
example, an individual outside of a theater could tune into the radio chan-
nel broadcasting the descriptive narration and obtain a high quality sound-
track of a recently released movie.199  In addition, the FCC would have to 
monitor what channels theaters could use; these channels are in-demand 
commodities with a limited supply.200  Accordingly, like its counterpart 
closed captioning, descriptive narration is plagued with logistical issues, 
making it difficult to implement in theaters. 
IV.   SUGGESTED ACTION 
The question remains:  should theater owners be required to install 
and provide equipment to fully accommodate its hearing and visually im-
paired customers under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)?  
Theater owners should not have to fully accommodate their hearing and 
visually impaired customers under the ADA.  Full compliance, as previ-
ously demonstrated, would come at a prohibitive cost.201  It would result in 
a misuse of the ADA because it would fail to balance both the interests of 
disabled Americans and the interests of those providing entertainment fa-
cilities to the public.  It is time for courts to end the recent trend tilting the 
balance in favor of the disabled by imposing prohibitive burdens on private 
enterprise.  To that end, there are three paths of action that would serve to 
strike a compromise between both interests:  limited compliance, post-
ponement, and shared obligation. 
A.  Limited Compliance 
The website for the National Association of the Deaf lists a variety of 
issues that disabled Americans face today, one of which is technology.202  
Movie captioning is one such issue, about which the Association states, 
People who are deaf or hard of hearing want to be able to attend 
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201.  See supra Part III.A–C. 
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any showing of any movie in any theater at any time, to sit any-
where in the movie theater with their family and friends, and to 
have equal access to the movie soundtrack through high quality 
captioning that is consistently reliable.203 
Although ideal, this statement is highly impractical because, as demon-
strated, this would come at an incredible cost to theater owners.204  Courts 
should not force this unrealistic expectation on theater owners.  A limited 
number of showings and a limited amount of equipment should be sufficient 
to serve a limited population.  Theater owners should not have to purchase an 
excessive amount of equipment to avoid a lawsuit alleging a violation of the 
ADA whenever the theater cannot serve a single disabled patron.  As the 
Court in Cornilles v. Regal Entertainment, Inc. elucidated, “there is no evi-
dence that . . . non-disabled customers have the ability to request that certain 
movies be played in the theaters.”205  Consequently, disabled customers 
should not be able to dictate the terms of their movie watching. 
Theaters should be able to implement a system that efficiently ex-
ploits a limited amount of equipment while making movie theater visits as 
convenient as possible for their disabled patrons.  For example, this could 
be achieved by calling in or purchasing a ticket that indicates a closed cap-
tioning or descriptive narration device will be required for the disabled pa-
tron’s use.  If the limited amount of ADA-compliant equipment runs out, 
the disabled patron will be informed and can then pick a future showing.  
Ultimately, theaters should not be in relentless fear of a lawsuit solely be-
cause they are unable to guarantee the constant accessibility of equipment 
for its disabled patrons.  A limited, but standard amount of equipment 
should be decided upon, and theaters should be confident that by meeting 
that number, they are fully compliant. 
Theaters should also have less stringent compliance requirements 
based on their geographic locations.  For instance, rural areas are less 
populous than urban areas and the smaller population has a corresponding 
decrease in the number of disabled individuals.  Therefore, it would be 
unfair for courts to place the same standards for accommodation on rural 
theater locations as they do on urban theater locations.  Requiring theater 
owners to make costly improvements for very few people would be an 
unfair burden to place on private enterprise.  Additionally, placing a 
lighter burden on rural theater locations would enable theater owners to 
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funnel their money to their urban locations, where their equipment for 
disabled individuals will have a greater impact by serving a greater por-
tion of the disabled population. 
B.  Postponement 
Regardless of compromises and agreements reached by theaters and 
their disabled customers, providing equipment to accommodate hearing and 
visually impaired customers should be postponed for three particular rea-
sons.  First, as previously mentioned, the majority of screens in the United 
States are not digital.206  Predictions for when all screens in the United 
States will become digital range anywhere from three to ten years.207  Since 
the technology to run closed captioning and descriptive narration on film 
screens does not exist,208 and it is very expensive to convert a film screen to 
a digital screen,209 postponement seems sensible.  Because it would be less 
burdensome for theater owners to provide auxiliary aids to their disabled 
customers without first having to pay for an expensive digital conversion, a 
better balancing under the ADA would take place once the huge financial 
hurdle of conversion has taken place. 
Secondly, standards for assistive devices have not yet been promul-
gated for the industry,210 and devices are still unreliable and in develop-
ment.211  Ultra Stereo Labs, a producer of IR emitter devices, states on its 
website that standards have not yet been developed.212  The website uses 
the term “draft” standards, indicating that while the Society of Motion Pic-
ture and Television Engineers is currently working on standards, they are 
not yet complete.213  Until such standards are developed, theater owners 
should not be required to invest in technology that may become outdated or 
even unusable should the devices not comply with the particular industry 
standards that are ultimately set. 
Lastly, it is unrealistic to burden theater owners at this time with a re-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206.  Interview with Alden, supra note 145. 
207.  Id.; see also Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Movie Captioning and 
Video Description, 75 Fed. Reg. 43467, 43473 (July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 
36). 
208.  Interview with Alden, supra note 145. 
209.  Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability; Movie Captioning and Video Descrip-
tion, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43473.  
210.  See Interview with Alden, supra note 145. 
211.  Id. 
212.  Infrared Closed Caption System, supra note 166 (stating that the closed captioning 
system complies with DCI and SMPTE draft standards and operates with any compliant digital 
cinema server).  
213.  Id. 
  
234 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:209 
quirement to make their theaters compliant with imperfect and still devel-
oping technology.214  As the Cornilles court posited, “is something better 
just around the corner?”215  Closed captioning systems are relatively new 
products—Doremi Cinema’s CaptiView system was only introduced in 
April 2010.216  Until technology catches up with the goals of disabled ad-
vocacy groups, theater owners should be given a respite from these unreal-
istic demands. 
C.  Shared Obligation 
There are limits on a public accommodation’s obligations to provide 
auxiliary aids and services.217  Even though the ADA requires public ac-
commodations to provide auxiliary aids and services, “it does not require a 
public accommodation to supply individually prescribed devices for per-
sons with disabilities.”218  For example, a public accommodation would not 
be required to provide a disabled individual with a wheelchair.219  How-
ever, ramps to allow a disabled individual to access the public accommoda-
tion with ease would be required. 
While theater owners may be required to provide access to the movie 
theaters, in applying the concept of limited obligation to closed captioning 
and narrative description in movie theaters, they should not be required to 
provide personal devices by which to view movies.  For example, with re-
gard to closed captioning, a theater may be required to provide either a 
Rear Window device on the back wall of its theater or an IR emitter device.  
However, it would be the responsibility of the patron to take advantage of 
this access by providing his or her own acrylic panel or infrared receiver.  
Likewise, regarding descriptive narration, patrons would be responsible for 
providing their own headphones, while the theater would be obligated to 
broadcast descriptive narration for the patrons to access.  Another solution 
might be for theaters to offer such devices for a small fee, one that would 
essentially only cover the purchase of new devices and their upkeep. 
It is also possible that the government would be willing to share this 
obligation.  In the recent Twenty-First Century Communications and 
Video Accessibility Act of 2010, President Obama signed a bill into law 
that, in his words, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214.  Interview with Alden, supra note 145. 
215.  Cornilles, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7025, at *22. 
216.  Gardiner, supra note 175. 
217.  1–3 ADA:  PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS § 3.02, supra note 45. 
218.  Id. 
219.  Id. 
	   
2011] LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF ENTERTAINMENT 235 
make[s] it easier for people who are deaf, blind, or live with 
visual impairment to do what many of us take for granted—
from navigating a TV or DVD menu to sending an email on a 
smart phone.  It sets new standards so that Americans with dis-
abilities can take advantage of the technology our economy de-
pends on.220 
A provision of the Act grants authority to the FCC to set up programs 
that “distribute specialized equipment used to make telecommunications 
and Internet-enabled communication services accessible to individuals who 
are deaf-blind. . . .”221  This support is capped at $10 million per year.222  
However, this government program has a huge potential impact on the is-
sue of closed captioning and descriptive narration in theaters.  It shows that 
the United States government is amenable to subsidizing equipment for the 
disabled, and that consequently, similar programs could perhaps be set up 
to enable low-income disabled theater patrons to acquire their own auxil-
iary aids for viewing movies or to help theaters purchase equipment.  Al-
though contingent upon standards being developed for closed captioning 
and descriptive narration, disabled theater patrons could easily purchase 
equipment that would work in any theater across the United States.  In this 
way, the costs of providing greater disabled theater access would be bal-
anced between both parties. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act’s (“ADA”) purpose of providing 
“a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities”223 has unquestioned valid-
ity.  However, in seeking to end discrimination against individuals, it is im-
portant not to merely redirect that discrimination elsewhere.  Theater 
owners cannot be made to bear the undue burden of complete accommoda-
tion without greatly distorting and misusing the ADA. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220.  Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President at the Signing of the 21st 
Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act of 2010 (Oct. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/10/08/remarks-president-signing-21st-century-
communications-and-video-accessib. 
221.  21st Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF THE DEAF, http://www.nad.org/issues/civil-rights/communications-act/21st-century-act (last 
visited July 26, 2011) (describing the 21st Century Communications and Video Accessibility 
Act). 
222.  Id. 
223.  42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2010). 
  
236 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:209 
Erica N. Lucero* 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 * J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School, 2012; B.A., University of Southern California, 
2008.  The author would like to thank Wendy Aylsworth and Bryce Alden for not just participat-
ing in the entertainment industry, but being scholars of it as well, and generously sharing their 
knowledge.  The author would also like to thank Jim Whittlesey and John Wolski for kindly shar-
ing their expertise.  This article would not have been possible without the tireless work of Profes-
sor Sarah Bensinger and the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law 
Review; their continuous efforts are greatly appreciated.  Finally, a special thank you to Ed, 
Wendy, and Jackie Lucero, without which nothing would be possible. 
